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In February 1922, Winston Churchill, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
apologized to the House of Commons, 
for intruding “upon their patience on 
Irish matters” before moving the Second 
Reading of the Irish Free State (Agree-
ment) Bill (HC Deb 16 Feburary 1922, 
c. 1261). The consequent Act would 
implement the Treaty that was recently 
concluded between Irish rebels and the 
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British Crown. Churchill accepted that there were still 
matters to be finalized, notably “all this trouble in regard 
to the boundaries . . . of [the counties of] Fermanagh and 
Tyrone” (c. 1270). In 1914, the attempt to devise an ex-
clusion of Ulster from Irish Home Rule had foundered 
on this same issue for, even though the dispute had been 
“narrowed down” to very small areas within these two 
counties, “the problem appeared to be as insuperable as 
ever, and neither side would agree to reach any conclu-
sion” (c. 1270). Churchill was clearly exasperated that a 
great imperial power should be stalled in this manner. Af-
ter the failure to reach agreement in 1914, the World War 
of 1914 to 1918 supervened, and much that seemed fixed 
was thereby loosed:
The whole map of Europe has been changed. The posi-
tion of countries has been violently altered. The modes 
of thought of men, the whole outlook on affairs, the 
grouping of parties, all have encountered violent and 
tremendous changes in the deluge of the world, but as 
the deluge subsides and the waters fall short we see the 
dreary steeples of Fermanagh and Tyrone emerging once 
again. The integrity of their quarrel is one of the few 
institutions that has been unaltered in the cataclysm 
which has swept the world. (c. 1270)
Continually, the Irish question had forced itself upon 
British minds. For Churchill, “It says a great deal for the 
power which Ireland has . . . to lay their hands upon the 
vital strings of British life and politics, and to hold, domi-
nate, and convulse, year after year, generation after gen-
eration, the politics of this powerful country” (cc. 1270–
71). The contradictions are evident. Churchill thought 
the Irish question was primarily an Irish dispute and yet it 
somehow preoccupied British politicians. This Irish ques-
tion was about a seemingly trivial matter but the Irish 
refused to compromise with each other. In language less 
elegant but no less contemptuous, the current British For-
eign Secretary, Boris Johnson, also finds himself called on 
to talk about the border. As the United Kingdom negoti-
ates its withdrawal from the European Union (EU), it is 
hamstrung by the promises it made as part of the negotia-
tion of a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Northern 
Ireland. On 6 June 2018, Johnson said that the issue of 
the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern 
Ireland was being taken far too seriously: “It’s so small and 
there are so few firms that actually use that border regu-
larly, it’s just beyond belief that we’re allowing the tail to 
wag the dog in this way. We’re allowing the whole of our 
agenda to be dictated by this folly” (Spence 2018). Again, 
the issue is understood as external to Great Britain, as 
trivial, and as pressed unreasonably by Irish people. Why 
did Britain have an Irish problem? Well, that would be a 
colonial question, Mr. Churchill. Why does it still have 
an Irish problem? That, in turn, would be a postcolonial 
question, Mr. Johnson.
I have argued elsewhere that taking up the theoretical 
categories of Giorgio Agamben, colonial rule in Ireland 
might be understood as creating a colonial space of ex-
ception (Kearns 2006). The British saw themselves as 
broadly liberal, gifting the Irish a rule by law. Yet, in Ire-
land they were forced time and again to suspend elements 
of that law because they did not get consent to their rule. 
The British could not coerce the Irish into fealty; they 
could not rule by law.
Time and again, the English, and later British, authori-
ties reinvaded Ireland, establishing a new landed elite. 
For much of the eighteenth century, Ireland had some 
measure of self-government, but when, fired by the repub-
licanism of revolutionary France, the United Irishmen 
recruited French support for a rebellion (1798), the Brit-
ish government decided on more direct rule. From 1801, 
Ireland was a part of a United Kingdom and its represen-
tatives sat as a minority part of the Imperial House of 
Commons. This became one way that the Irish remained 
able “to lay their hands upon the vital strings” of Brit-
ish politics. For example, in the general election of 1910, 
the Liberal Party got 272 seats, one more than the Con-
servatives, but shy of the 335 needed to form a majority 
government. From Ireland, 103 members of Parliament 
were returned, of whom seventy-three were in the Irish 
Parliamentary Party (IPP), whose primary purpose was to 
get home rule for Ireland. Together with the IPP, the Lib-
erals could form a majority coalition government but the 
price was explicit. From 1912 home rule legislation was 
debated in the British Parliament, sending Churchill and 
the Cabinet to examine maps of Tyrone and Fermanagh 
in hope of tracing out the limits of Ulster’s exclusion from 
self-governing Ireland.
The roots and nature of Ulster’s identity remain conten-
tious issues in Irish historiography. In the Atlas of the Irish 
Revolution, Smyth highlights the importance of 1798. 
Faced with the insurgency of the United Irishmen, the 
Protestant Orange Order was “deliberately mobilised by 
the British ruling elite,” marking “the first time that ac-
tive collusion with a defensive-cum-sectarian movement 
was used by the British state as a counter-revolutionary 
strategy in Ireland” (p. 22). It would not be the last. After 
the 1910 election, and faced with the risk of home rule 
for Ireland, the British Conservative Party formed an al-
liance with the Ulster Protestants, presenting home rule 
as a dangerous first step toward the unraveling of the Brit-
ish Empire, and giving Conservatives an ideological pur-
pose (the defense of the constitution) around which they 
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might mobilize, as Callanan noted in his Atlas essay on 
the home rule crisis, “to challenge the intellectual ascen-
dancy of incremental Liberal progressivism” (p. 140) and, 
“[h]alf catalyst, half pretext, the north-east of Ireland 
transcended its territorial confines to become for those 
on the right of British politics a highly charged imperial 
symbol” (p. 142). Within Ulster, the prospect of home 
rule drew from one leading supporter of the Union with 
Britain, the threat that “the morning Home Rule passes,” 
Unionists would be prepared on their own account “to 
become responsible for the Government of the Protestant 
Province of Ulster,” and in the following year, the leader 
of the British Conservative Party encouraged such insur-
rection, promising that he could “imagine no length of 
resistance to which Ulster can go in which I should not 
be prepared to support them” (p. 142).
Ireland looked set for a civil war. Organized as the Ul-
ster Volunteers, unionists had been importing arms, and, 
from 1913, had been drilling a militia. In March 1914, a 
group of about 100 officers with the British Army based 
in Ireland had vowed that they would not proceed against 
Unionists if asked to do so. But then World War I inter-
rupted matters and the Act was suspended for the dura-
tion of the conflict.
The Great War changed things utterly. Irish national-
ists were divided over whether they should support the 
war or not. The leader of the IPP said that the cause of 
independence would best be served by showing loyalty 
to the British Crown. Yet the British Crown could not 
count on this. By January 1916, the British government 
had introduced conscription in Britain, but dared not in 
Ireland. In April 1918, the British Parliament returned to 
the question and, despite a warning from the head of the 
British army in Ireland that they “might as well conscript 
Germans” (p. 324), had passed a conscription act for Ire-
land that they then failed to make effective in the face of 
an Irish general strike. With that failure, as Travers notes, 
it was evident that “Britain [had] lost Ireland” (p. 323). In 
the general election of December 1918 that followed the 
end of World War I, it was the separatist, republican, and 
militaristic Sinn Féin that swept the Irish seats. The IPP 
could manage only six from the 105 in contention, and 
the Irish Unionist Party garnered twenty-two, and Sinn 
Féin made its debut with seventy-three seats. Refusing to 
serve in a British Parliament, Sinn Féin members, or at 
least those not in prison or on the run, convened their 
own Dáil [parliament] in Dublin. As the military wing 
of the republican movement, the Irish Republic Army 
(IRA) now began its war against British occupation and, 
by 1921, the British army educated the British Cabinet to 
the view that Ireland could only be held with a level of 
repression that was surely unacceptable. Instead, a truce 
and then a treaty were negotiated, and by December an 
Irish Free State was established on twenty-six of Ireland’s 
thirty-two counties. The ten years from the introduction 
of the Home Rule Bill in 1912 to the inauguration of the 
Irish Free State in 1922 are now being commemorated as 
a “Decade of Centenaries” by the government of the Re-
public of Ireland.
For the questions of history and memory raised by the 
Decade, Helen Laird’s Commemoration is an excellent 
guide. Laird considers the Decade agenda as state-centric 
and progressivist. It is state-centric because it emphasizes 
legislation and government institutions. It is progressivist 
because it treats the present as an improvement over the 
past, achieved by eliminating the obstacles to change. As 
an alternative, Laird proposes an avant-garde nostalgia, 
a concept borrowed from a philosopher, Kate Soper, but 
best exemplified here in an extended quotation from an 
1897 essay by Irish socialist James Connolly on the con-
tinuing relevance of Gaelic communalism:
The ardent student of sociology, who believes that the 
progress of the human race through the various stages 
of communism, chattel slavery, feudalism and wage slav-
ery, has been but a preparation for the higher ordered 
society of the future . . . will perhaps regard the Irish 
adherence to clan ownership at such a comparatively 
recent date as the seventeeth century as evidence of a 
retarded economic development, and therefore a real 
hindrance to progress. But the sympathetic student of 
history, who believes in the possibility of a people by 
political intuition anticipating the lessons afterwards re-
vealed to them in the sad school of experience, will not 
be indisposed to join with the ardent Irish patriot in his 
lavish expressions of admiration for the sagacity of his 
Celtic forefathers, who foreshadowed in the democratic 
organisation of the Irish clan the more perfect organisa-
tion of the free society of the future. (pp. 45–46)
Forgiving Connolly the clumsy double negative, we find 
in this extraordinary passage a rebuke to progressive 
views of history, with Connolly arguing that resisting 
unwelcome change is prescient rather than regressive. It 
also suggests that some beneficial institutions fall under 
the wheels of the juggernaut of history, and in recogniz-
ing these a backward glance might disclose hope. Beyond 
this, Laird wants to make a more specific case about the 
revolutionary decade itself. Turning her gaze away from 
the parliamentary and social elites, Laird finds the revo-
lutionary decade was a time of radical possibility chanced 
by the rural poor. This is an attempt to give voice to an 
egalitarian vision that, from the trenches of the Somme, 
an Irish poet Thomas Kettle described as the cause of his 
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life, “a dream born in a herdsman’s hut . . . the secret 
scripture of the poor’ (“To My Daughter Betty, The Gift 
of God”).
The force that imposed capitalist relations of produc-
tion on the poor people of rural Ireland was colonialism. 
Communalism stalled the triumph of absolute property 
rights. For the British, then, it had to go. Across extensive 
parts of rural Ireland, however, resistance to capitalism 
was granular, guerrilla, and general. The law of the bour-
geois property order could not be installed by consent: It 
had to be imposed by force. Juries could not be trusted, 
so judgment had to be summary. For much of the nine-
teenth century, and unlike England, large parts of Ireland 
saw the right to bear arms suspended, the right to trial by 
jury suspended, the right of assembly suspended, and so 
it went on. The last third of the nineteenth century saw 
a rural revolt so general as to fairly earn its contempo-
rary moniker, the “Land War.” A great Irish revolution-
ary, Michael Davitt, described the evils that beset the 
countryside as landlordism, introduced by the English 
as a new feudal property when they took the land from 
the native Irish. As late as 1860, the British Parliament 
was still passing laws to eradicate communal property in 
Ireland and to give landowners absolute rights. Irish resis-
tance to capitalism was a resistance to this absolute and 
individual form of property ownership. Because it took 
colonial force to give capitalism the field, anticapitalist 
agitation was anticolonial, and, because ejecting colonial 
power implied self-government, anticolonial agitation 
was nationalist. In each of his first two periods as Lib-
eral Prime Minister, William Gladstone passed Land Acts 
for Ireland. Gladstone accepted that Irish people would 
not agree to the English version of landlord rights and 
he thought that by concessions on this he could spike 
the anticolonialism that Irish resistance fostered. Acts of 
1870 and 1881 conceded rights to tenants, setting rents by 
tribunal rather than in the market, and effectively mak-
ing landlord and tenant joint owners.
Laird describes “periods of potent possibility” (p. 33), 
seemingly fecund with counterfactual speculation about 
how things could be better. The rural insurgency fed such 
a revolutionary imagination. In an essay for the Atlas, 
Smyth finds much of the ideological and geographical 
basis of the Irish revolution in this rural insurgency. The 
heartland of the Land War were the districts in the west 
of Ireland crammed with landless poor people reluctantly 
accepting any opportunity to emigrate away from shame-
ful poverty. The region proved to be a bedrock of political 
separatism, and Smyth’s essay emphasizes the culture of 
insurgency nursed in these districts over the preceding 
century. This vital, revolutionary heritage looked back to 
what had been taken away, but it could also engage with 
contemporary debates about liberalism, socialism, and 
economics, particularly when in dialogue with organic 
intellectuals such as Connolly, Davitt, or Lalor (Kearns 
2014).
The centrepiece of the revolutionary decade was in some 
respects a geographical anomaly: The Rising in Dublin, 
which began on Easter Monday, 26 April 1916, included 
about 1,400 people. Fearghal McGarry’s Atlas essay de-
scribes the well-known geography of the rebels’ encamp-
ments and attempted maneuvers within the city, during 
the six days it took the British to force an Irish surrender 
(pp. 240–57). Jérôme aan de Wiel’s contribution frames 
the Rising differently. He argues that, having broken the 
German codes, the British military leaders in London 
knew in advance of the Rising and its certain failure, 
and, in welcoming the repressive opportunity that an 
abortive putsch would give, decided not to tell the Brit-
ish authorities based in Dublin (p. 231). The deaths in 
Dublin were a little shy of 500 and about half were ci-
vilians. Sixteen of the insurgents were executed in the 
six weeks that followed. In some quarters, these sixteen 
would later be venerated as martyrs who gave their lives 
for Irish freedom.
Irishmen, both unionist and nationalist, both Catholic 
and Protestant, residents either of Ireland or Britain, 
joined the British army during the Great War of 1914 to 
1918, and of the 210,000 who enlisted, between 30,000 
and 35,000 died, a number that, as Horne shows in his es-
say for the Atlas, was some five to six times the combined 
mortality of the Easter Rising of 1916, the War of Inde-
pendence of 1919 to 1921, and the Civil War of 1922 and 
1923. Members of the Ulster Volunteers joined en masse 
under their own officers; nationalist and Catholic Irish 
were not trusted in like manner and were given British of-
ficers. The deaths of these thousands of Ulster Protestants 
were soon cherished as a sacrifice for Ulster, a blood bond 
between unionists and Great Britain.
So things stood at the end of World War I. With the Brit-
ish government unwilling to give precedence to enacting 
the home rule measures that had been suspended for the 
duration of the war, the IRA began to make Ireland un-
governable, attacking police barracks and stealing guns. 
Martial law was declared across much of south and south-
west Ireland, and the British army began attacking vil-
lages that were shielding rebels. The army and the armed 
police in Ireland were supplemented by auxiliaries re-
cruited in Britain who, dubbed Black-and-Tans by virtue 
of their makeshift uniforms, became notorious for their 
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ill-disciplined violence. Reprisals and collective punish-
ment were effectively official policy by the end of 1920, 
but from the heartland of the Land War, in the west, 
southwest, and south, the insurgents continued with a 
guerrilla war that the British found difficult to quench. In 
Dublin, the IRA had a few spectacular intelligence suc-
cesses, including discovering and then, on the morning of 
Sunday 21 November 1920, killing some fourteen British 
undercover agents at their homes. That afternoon a group 
of Black-and-Tans burst into Croke Park, Dublin, firing 
into the crowd at a Gaelic football match, killing four-
teen civilians and wounding sixty more. The IRA burned 
some 275 (10 percent) of the so-called big houses of rural 
Ireland; some of these had been billeting British soldiers. 
Over 11 ad 12 December, Black-and-Tans set fire to large 
parts of the central districts of the city of Cork. In Bel-
fast, street riots and arsonists’ eviction of Catholics from 
mixed areas killed 267 Catholics and 185 Protestants, and 
reduced 650 houses to ash.
There was more than destruction and murder, though. 
Some of the attacks on big houses attempted to evict 
large-scale graziers and reclaim the land for local tillage. 
In Roscommon, land that was held by the Congested Dis-
tricts Board as part of a planned redistribution to tenant 
farmers, was instead occupied by villagers who set about 
reestablishing communal farming on strips within com-
mon fields (Laird, p. 54).
The British filled Irish prisons with rebels, and riots 
within and protests without soon followed. The British 
opened internment camps. In 1921 these Irish prisons 
had, as Murphy shows in his essay in the Atlas, some 1,343 
rebels incarcerated after the summary justice of courts 
martial. The British sent the more dangerous IRA leaders 
to prison in Britain and, faced with hunger strikes, let die 
three Irish men under their control, recalling the Fam-
ine to any Irish mind, when, over the seven years from 
1845 to 1852, over 1 million died and a further 1.5 million 
had emigrated from a population of about 9 million. The 
British wanted to clear the potato eaters off the land and 
to consolidate holdings into pastures from which cattle 
would be marched to the table of urban Britain. Unsur-
prisingly, migration continued, and the population of Ire-
land declined continually from the time of the Famine to 
World War I, when it stood at about 3 million, a third of 
the level some seventy years earlier.
In speaking of dissensus in Ireland, for Churchill to refer 
to the “integrity of their struggle” was imperial disingenu-
ousness of the purest water. The Irish struggle was not in 
the main an internal one. The British Empire was about 
to lose its first significant territory since the American 
War of Independence, but rather than prepare the island 
for peaceful independence, the British were steeling the 
resolve of unionist opposition. In 1886, Churchill’s father, 
Randolph, had given Ulster one of its proudest boasts: 
“Ulster will fight and Ulster will be right.” When an early 
biography of Randolph Churchill was published, one re-
viewer remarked that it showed Randolph “participating 
in politics for the sheer pleasure of it . . . a cynical politi-
cian who believed that the gyrations of political parties 
had value for their own sake” (Chartwell Books 2008). 
Could the Ulster policy of Randolph Churchill really be 
a callous excitation of unionism primarily for domestic 
political ends, and Ireland a mere chip in the roulette that 
was British party and parliamentary politics? That early 
biography said as much, quoting a letter of 1888 from 
Randolph to a political ally: “I decided some time ago 
. . . that if [Gladstone] went for Home Rule, the Orange 
card would be the one to play” (Churchill 1906, p. 89). 
The author was his son, Winston. When, as Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, then, Churchill affected dismay at 
the long-standing Irish mutual antipathy that tried par-
liamentary patience, he knew full well the complicity of 
British politicians in encouraging resistance even to the 
point of insurrection.
This was the legacy the British shaped in 1922. As they 
left, the erstwhile masters extracted from the Irish Free 
State a contentious oath of loyalty to the British mon-
arch, destabilizing that polity. To the six counties they 
gave untrammelled Protestant majoritarian rule, brutaliz-
ing that polity. In neither case did the British attend at all 
to the interests, or even safety, of the minority left on the 
wrong side of the line. In the twenty-six counties, stabil-
ity was installed, but only by giving the Catholic Church 
a force in social policy and civil society that imperiled the 
autonomy of women, children, and free thought generally. 
In Northern Ireland, for the fifty years of the Stormont 
Parliament (1922–1972), the Protestant majority exer-
cised one-party rule and a permanent suspension of civil 
liberties (special powers).
In After Ireland (2017), Declan Kiberd describes how lit-
erature responded to these postcolonial polities. He docu-
ments writers’ profound and deepening disillusion. For 
Kiberd, Samuel Beckett’s tramps are living after a promise 
that was not kept, a world in which people must live in 
the wake of the intolerable. Of course, there were many 
other reasons why Beckett refused optimism, and Emilie 
Morin’s brilliant new book, Beckett’s Political Imagination, 
discusses many of them, but the hostility of Catholic Ire-
land and its proto-fascist Anglo-Irish cultural elite toward 
cosmopolitanism was certainly primary.
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If the Republic disappointed, Northern Ireland was ap-
palling. Inspired by the bravery of African-American 
civil rights campaigns in the United States, northern 
Catholics campaigned for political rights and eco-
nomic fairness from the mid-1960s, only to be met by 
an armed police force, an armed militia, and later still 
by the British army once again. At this point, their 
peril revived republican, nationalist struggle. On both 
sides, informal militias disciplined their own communi-
ties to shield their armed men from the police or army. 
They also found easy targets among neighbors from the 
other side. There was extreme pressure on literature to 
serve, rather than remain independent of, the struggle, 
and Kiberd provides a moving account of the courage 
of Nobel Laureate Seamus Heaney, who insisted instead 
on the necessity of facts against the comfort of cliché, 
requiring that culpability be judged rather than excused 
or explained away.
The counterinsurgency tactics developed by the British 
army in Ireland, and inflicted along the ragged edge of its 
unravelling empire from Malaya to Kenya, now returned 
to the six counties. Thirty years of violence and an aver-
age ten violent deaths per month, however, brought an 
acceptance that Protestant privilege must be qualified 
and that republicanism must stick to the ballot, not the 
bullet. Republicans were given a context in which their 
tradition was promised parity of esteem and in which 
there would be a political context for all-Ireland coopera-
tion. Protestants shared in a peace dividend. To monitor 
fairness, though, many aspects of Northern Ireland soci-
ety are now organized for two tribes, reinforcing separa-
tion. In this respect, Declan Long’s Ghost-Haunted Land 
shows how some artists at least followed the example of 
the Heaney, anticipating some of the arguments on the 
strategic use of memory in Northern Ireland put forth by 
Robinson (2018) in his recent book Transitional Justice 
and the Politics of Inscription (reviewed by Sarah McDow-
ell in this issue). After the heroic achievement of peace 
with the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement in 1998, there 
was a devious invitation to move on and forget.
People were being asked to move into a world in which 
everything could start afresh, a world with no history. 
This is the neoliberal imaginary of absolute property, 
where commodities come with neither messy social ties 
nor historical obligations. In this sense, the spectral, 
the ghosts of the past, as Long points out, might vac-
cinate against spectacle. For example, Long discusses 
Willie Doherty’s film installation, Ghost Story (2007
AQ1 ). The film begins by comparing the thin trace left 
by a landscape with the permanent impression of a face 
seen in a crowd, which, from the context becomes clear, 
was someone fleeing the slaughter of Bloody Sunday in 
Derry, 30 January 1972. The following day, the Brit-
ish Home Secretary said he believed that the army had 
been fired on and, in protecting themselves, had shot 
dead thirteen armed civilians (another would die later 
from his wounds), but promised a tribunal. The Widg-
ery Report that followed was quickly issued and included 
evidence that was only heard in private, with no cross-
examination, and led to the exoneration of the soldiers 
within eleven weeks. As part of the Peace Process, in 
1998 the British Prime Minister promised a new, public 
inquiry. In 2010, accepting the findings of the Saville 
Report, another British Prime Minister said that the 
British government accepted that the fourteen killed 
had been unarmed and that their shooting was “unjusti-
fied and unjustifiable” (McDonald and Bowcott 2010). 
This is the bloody history over which a neoliberal peace 
barks the peremptory command, forgive and forget.
As in 1912, so in 2017, a general election in the United 
Kingdom left an Irish party holding the balance of 
power between the two largest (British) parties. Once 
again the empire is in question, a vainglorious English 
nostalgia imagining a world where, shorn of European 
obligations, the United Kingdom can swagger abroad. 
Once again, there is an Irish problem. The UK govern-
ment is committed to the Good Friday/Belfast Agree-
ment, which, in settling the conflict in Northern Ire-
land, promised that whoever held sovereignty over the 
six counties would exercise that authority “with rigorous 
impartiality on behalf of all the people in the diversity 
of their identities and traditions” (Belfast Agreement 
1998). In making an agreement with the Democratic 
Unionist Party to ensure Conservatives could govern 
with a parliamentary majority, this impartiality was set 
aside. The election of 2017 had been called in the hope 
that the Conservatives would increase their parliamen-
tary majority and could thus implement with renewed 
authority the opinion of the referendum of 2016, which 
had only produced a slight majority for leaving the EU. 
In any event, the Conservative parliamentary majority 
disappeared, and hence the deal with the DUP AQ2 . It is 
not at all clear that the U.K. government can implement 
a revision of the status of the border between the Repub-
lic and Northern Ireland without the explicit consent 
of the people of the six counties (who actually voted 
to remain in the EU). The Agreement declared that “it 
would be wrong to make any change in the status of 
Northern Ireland save with the consent of a majority of 
its people.” Introducing a land border between Northern 
Ireland and the Republic is certainly a change in the 
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status of Northern Ireland, as would be the introduc-
tion of a sea border between Northern Ireland and Great 
Britain. Brexit in any likely form is precisely a change 
in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. A land 
border sets Northern nationalists further apart from 
their southern compatriots. A sea border sets Northern 
unionists further apart from their British compatriots. 
In any likely version, Brexit makes the dual-identity 
Irish–British harder to sustain across the two communi-
ties in Northern Ireland.
Yet, some version of this dual identity is central to the 
resolution of conflict in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, 
the British were only able to achieve this resolution in 
the context of EU institutions that dissolved to a very 
large degree the significance of the border. Now, all of 
this is cast aside so that Britain can feel more indepen-
dent, and can desist payments to the EU. The dishonesty 
of the promises made by the Brexit side is not my main 
concern here; rather, it is the fact that at no point dur-
ing the debate did any of the principal Brexiteers give a 
thought to Ireland, and that is why we now see a British 
Foreign Secretary assuring a bunch of Thatcherites that 
it is mere “folly” to believe that the Irish question places 
any serious check on UK geopolitical ambition. It should, 
though, and these books explain why.
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